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Empirical evidence suggests that social structure may have changed from hierarchical to egali-
tarian and back along the evolutionary line of humans. We model a society subject to competing
cognitive and social navigation constraints. The theory predicts that the degree of hierarchy de-
creases with encephalization and increases with group size. Hence hominin groups may have been
driven from a phase with hierarchical order to a phase with egalitarian structures by the encephal-
ization during the last two million years, and back to hierarchical due to fast demographical changes
during the Neolithic. The dynamics in the perceived social network shows evidence in the egal-
itarian phase of the observed phenomenon of Reverse Dominance. The theory also predicts for
modern hunter-gatherers in mild climates a trend towards an intermediate hierarchy degree and a
phase transition for harder ecological conditions. In harsher climates societies would tend to be
more egalitarian if organized in small groups but more hierarchical if in large groups. The theoret-
ical model permits organizing the available data in the cross-cultural record (Ethnographic Atlas,
N=248 cultures) where the symmetry breaking transition can be clearly seen.
I. INTRODUCTION
Behavioral phylogenetics makes it plausible that the common ancestor of Homo and Pan genera had a
hierarchical social structure [1–5]. Paleolithic humans with a foraging lifestyle, however, most likely had a
largely egalitarian society and yet hierarchical structures became again common in the Neolithic period.
Contemporary illiterate societies fill the ethological spectrum [6] from egalitarian to authoritarian and
despotic. This non-monotonic journey, a so called U-shaped trajectory, along the egalitarian-hierarchical
spectrum during human evolution, was stressed by Knauft [1] and has defied theory despite several
attempts of anthropological explanation [1]. Our approach to the study of social organization uses
tools of information theory and statistical mechanics. It is inspired in previous work by Terano et al.
[7, 8] on a different problem, the emergence of money in a barter society as a consequence of limited
cognitive capacity. We model the perception by each agent of the social network of its society, taking into
account cognitive constraints and social navigation demands, which define the informational constraints
adequate to a probabilistic description. According to the model, whether an egalitarian-symmetric or
hierarchical-broken symmetry state occurs depends on a scaling parameter which grows with cognitive
capacity and decreases with group size, modulated by a Lagrange multiplier which can be interpreted
as an environmental pressure. The hypothesis that social perceptions mediate motivations and hence
possible behaviors (PMB hypothesis), permits making predictions about the effect of these variables in
the probable forms of social organization. Since there was a massive increase in encephalic mass in the last
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2two million years, our theory expects a phase transition towards a more egalitarian social organization
to occur. As food producing and storage methods permitted the populational increase in the Neolithic,
the scaling parameter decrease permitted a reversal to hierarchical structures.
Furthermore, the same model makes predictions about a totally different empirical situation, dealing
with the influence of ecology on the expected hierarchy of modern human groups. The theory suggests
a form of looking at the available ethnographic data [9, 10] and allows a new interpretation of observed
patterns involving social structure, community size and environment in terms of a competition between
cognitive constraints and social navigation demands and a symmetry breaking phase transition. The
bifurcation suggested by the theory is seen in the ethnographic records. The empirical data can be found
in the Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas [9], which resulted from the tour de force attempt to compile all
ethnographic available knowledge that can be represented in a quantitative form.
We are studying the properties of finite size groups and so cannot take the thermodynamic limit. The
changes in behavior are therefore not singular but we still find that the language of phase transitions
is adequate, after all from a technical point of view the infinite size limit is a tool to simplify the
mathematical treatment of very large systems.
II. THE THEORY AND THE MODEL
In a group of n agents, each agent of the group will have a perceived social web of interactions rep-
resented by a graph. An important distinction has to be made between the social network, that say an
ethnographer might describe and the perceived social network of a particular agent. Each vertex of a
graph stands for a represented agent of the group. In this representation of the social web, undirected
edges joining any pair of vertices might be present or not. An edge links two represented agents if their
social relation is known by the owner of the graph. Since inference depends on the available information,
these graphs might differ from agent to agent. Call Si the representation of the social web by agent i,
given by a set {sijk} of variables that can take values either zero or one. The indices i, j and k run from
1 to n and every sijk is symmetric with respect to interchange of the lower indices. If s
i
jk = 1 then agent
i has knowledge of the social relation, the capacity to cooperate and form coalitions or the antagonism
between agents j and k, while if sijk = 0 this relation is unknown to agent i. Known alliances, feuds or
neutral interactions are represented by sijk = 1. The total number of memorized social relations is
N icog =
n∑
j,k=1
sijk/2 (1)
the number of edges in the social web representation of agent i. This is a cognitive contribution to the
cost of a given representation Si.
Now consider the agent i’s social cost for not knowing a given social relationship, when sijk = 0. For
two agents j and k there is either a bond or a path of bonds, joining intervening agents, connecting them
so that their social relation can be estimated by agent i. We will assume that the representation is a
connected graph, what can be accomplished by defining the distance of two unconnected vertices to be
infinite. It is reasonable to assume that this lack of direct knowledge will imply in a social cost which
increases with the length of the shortest path between the agents. This implements the idea that relying
on heuristics to infer the relationship between them (e.g., “a friend of an enemy is an enemy”, etc.) is
more amenable to errors as the number of intermediate agents grows.
Call lijk the social distance in the graph defined by the adjacency matrix S
i. The λ−th power of Si,
Mi(λ) = [Si]λ
permits verifying whether there is a path joining two agents, and the social distance is
lijk = minλ, such that M
i(λ)jk > 0
3FIG. 1. Each agent has a perceived social web of interactions represented by a graph. Each vertex of a
graph stands for a represented agent of the group. An edge in this perceived web links two agents if
their social relation is known by the owner of the graph. Using the methods of information theory
entropic inference, we attribute a probability P (Si|I) that agent i perceives a network Si, conditional
on any available information I.
is the length of the smallest path of bonds linking j and k. We take the social cost of agent i of having
a representation Si to be just the distance averaged over all pairs of agents
L¯i =
2
n(n− 1)
n∑
j,k=1
lijk. (2)
The joint cognitive-social cost of the representation is defined as a sum of monotonic functions of N icog
and L¯i and the simplest form is just
C0(S
i) = N icog + αL¯
i, (3)
For high α, optimization is obtained by decreasing L¯i independently of N ie. For low α the number of
edges N icog has to be controlled, independently of L¯
i. Hence α is a parameter of the theory that measures
the relative importance of the social and cognitive components and can be interpreted as a measure of
the cognitive capacity of the agent.
We now attribute a probability P (Si|I) that agent i perceives a network Si = {sijk}, conditional on
any available information I, using the methods of information theory entropic inference. Call C = IE(C0)
the expected value of C0(S
i) under P (Si|I):
C = IE(C0) =
∑
Si
C0P (S
i|I) (4)
Suppose that either C or equivalently the scale in which fluctuations of C0(Si) above its minimum are
important, are known. Or possibly we just know that such knowledge would be useful, but we have no
access to their specific values at present. The procedure calls for the maximization of the entropy (see
e.g [11]) subject to the known constraints,
P (Si|I) = argmaxP
{
−
∑
Si
P (Si) logP (Si)− λ
[∑
Si
P (Si)− 1
]
− β
[∑
Si
P (Si)C0(S
i)− C
]}
(5)
4The result is the standard Boltzmann-Gibbs probability distribution
P (Si|I) = 1
Z
e−βC0(S
i), (6)
where β is the Lagrange multiplier conjugated variable to C and controls the scale in which the fluctuations
are important. The information content in β is equivalent to that in C. Low β values means that Si
configurations of high joint cost will not be unlikely. For high β only configurations near the ground state
will be possible. We can interpret β as an ecological pressure, possibly correlated to a measure of the
effort to collect a minimum number of calories in one day. The normalization factor in equation 6, the
partition function Z, depends on the number of agents, α and β: Z = Z(n, α, β).
In order to characterize the state of the system we need appropriate order parameters. In particular
we want to probe whether represented agents are considered symmetrically or if distinctions are made.
It is useful to introduce the degree of vertex j in a graph Si, dij =
∑
k s
i
jk, the number of edges emerging
from the vertex or in the case of the represented social web, the number of memorized social relations of
an agent; as well as the maximum degree and the average
dimax = maxjd
i
j , d
i
avg =
1
n
n∑
j=1
dij .
Natural order parameters are the expectation values IE(dmax) and IE(davg) with respect to P (S
i|I), the
Boltzmann distribution in equation 6.
III. METHODS
Several techniques can be used to obtain estimates of the order parameters and here we present results
obtained employing numerical Monte Carlo methods. We first considered isolated agents and the Monte
Carlo simulation of the Boltzmann distribution (eq 6). Then we considered 2-body interactions of the
n agents, exchanging information about other pairs of individuals, through a mechanism that can be
called gossip. The effect of gossip is to generate highly correlated perceived social webs. The advantage
of Monte Carlo methods is that a simple extension of the type of dynamics permits incorporating very
simply interactions like gossip.
We now run the simulation for the n agents together. A parameter g (0 < g < 1) measures the intensity
of information exchange through gossip. Choose an agent i and pair (j, k), independently of anything else,
uniformly at random. With probability 1− g, a MC Metropolis update is performed on the bond of the
pair (j, k) . Let s¯ijk = 1− sijk be the complementary value of the bond variable sijk. Also independently
and uniformly at random, with probability g another agent is chosen, call it l. Its corresponding edge
sljk is copied to s¯
i
jk. Let C¯0 be the joint cognitive-social cost with the bond s
i
jk replaced by s¯
i
jk. With
probability min
{
exp(−β(C¯0 − C0)), 1
}
let the change of sijk by s¯
i
jk be accepted. Otherwise s
i
jk is kept
fixed.
The step performed with probability 1 − g simulates the update of the social web representation by
independent observations, learning new relations and forgetting about previously known relations. The
gossip step, done with probability g, simulates the exchange of information where agent l tells and agent
i learns or forgets something about the relation of agents j and k. Gossip can be introduced by more
elaborate schemes but this is sufficient for our modelling purposes.
After all i = 1, ...N have been considered, a MC sweep has been completed. The α range 4.5 ≤ α ≤ 90
was divided uniformly into 100 intervals; the β range 0 < β ≤ 20 was divided into 200 intervals. The
values of n varied from 7 to 15. The number of degrees of freedom is nn(n−1)2 = O(n3). We run a MC
simulation for each fixed n and for each pair of α and β. One to two million MC steps were made for
thermalization, and then data about the order parameters was collected every 4 MC steps for around
four million MCS. The results for the order parameters are shown in figures 2 and 3 are discussed below.
5FIG. 2. Top: Monte Carlo estimates of the maximum degree and the average degree (IE(davg)/(n− 1)
and IE(dmax)/(n− 1)) of the social web representation as a function of the specific cognitive capacity
per dyadic relation z = 2α/n(n− 1) for β = 10. The shaded areas are bands at ±1 std from the Monte
Carlo. Bottom: H = 2(1−D), with D = IE(davg)/IE(dmax). Roughly three regimes can be seen: for
very large z, H goes to zero (symmetric phase), all agents are equal. For very small z, H is ≈ 2, the
broken symmetry phase, where a particular agent occupies the central position of the web. An
intermediate z transition region shows intermediate values of H. All agents are statistically but not
strictly equals, some occupy, but only temporarily, in the stochastic dynamics a more central position.
The different curves are for different values of n(= 10, 11, ...15) , note the almost exact colapse when
plotted as a function of z. The insets are typical realizations of the inferred web of social interactions by
an agent at that z position. Bonds are only drawn if the bond variable is one.
The average length of the distances in a given graph Si has to be measured in each Metropolis step.
It was obtained using Dijkstra’s algorithm to calculate every pair distance.
IV. RESULTS
A. Joint dependence on cognition and band size
An interesting result is that, given β, to a good approximation the properties of the system do not
depend separately on α and n but on the ratio z = 2αn(n−1) , which can be thought of as a measure of the
effective cognitive capacity per dyadic relation on a social landscape.
6FIG. 3. Left, Hierarchical-Egalitarian phase transition: phase diagram in the plane of specific
cognitive capacity per dyadic relation z = 2αn(n−1) and the inverse ecological pressure β
−1. The color
code represents a measure of the social hierarchy measure or symmetry breaking parameter
H = 2− 2IE(davg)/IE(dmax). The red region is where the symmetry is broken (H near 2) and the
maximum degree IE(dmax) is much larger than the mean IE(davg). The blue region is the unbroken
symmetry phase, H ≈ 0. Right, same but for constant α in the log n, β plane. The white lines divide
the phase diagram into regions that can be used for the comparison to the Ethnographic Atlas data.
The dark red region is where the symmetry is broken and the maximum degree is much larger than the
mean. Dark blue is the symmetrical or egalitarian representation region.
FIG. 4. The effect of gossip inside the hierarchical phase. Continuous curves: The entropy (essentially
a measure of the width (eq. 7)) of the distribution of central agents decreases with the increase of
gossip, meaning that there is a particular agent that preferentially occupies the centers of the stars.
Dashed lines: Another way of seeing the same ordering: the frequency of the most frequent central
agent in their representations.
We start by considering the case with no gossip g = 0 where agents process information in a decou-
pled way. Larger g gives similar results for the individual web representations but they are no longer
independent and correlations of the webs appear. Figure 2 shows the results of Monte Carlo estimates of
the order parameters, the expected values of dmax and davg, respectivelyIE(davg) and IE(dmax). These
are plotted as a function of the scaling variable z = 2α/n(n− 1). In the bottom of figure 2 we show the
hierarchical order parameter H = 2− 2D as a function z for β fixed, where D = IE(davg)/IE(dmax). For
7H = 0 the typical graph is the totally symmetric graph, while for H = 2 the typical graph is the star.
Since n is finite, H can’t be 2. The maximum value is Hmax = 2(1 − 2/n + 1/n2) ≈ 2. Three different
regimes can be identified: low, intermediate and high H regions. In figure 3 (left) we show H as a heat
map in the z − β−1 plane. The three phases can be seen again. An intermediate fluid phase has the
shape of a wedge that decreases in width as ecological pressure increases.
B. Gossip and shared perception
Figure 4 shows how frequent is the most frequent central agent as a function of the level of gossip g.
Let P (c = j|i) be the probability that for the social web representation of agent i the central element
is j. The spreading of the probability distribution can be measured by the ratio of its entropy to the
maximum possible value
scf =
S¯
log n
=
−1
n log n
n∑
i,j=1
P (c = j|i) logP (c = j|i) (7)
The results indicate that large correlation occurs when gossip dynamics dominates independent dynamics,
starting around g ≈ 0.5.
FIG. 5. The probability of acceptance of changes P (acc|zβ) from the Monte Carlo simulations
measures the tolerance to changes in the social web representations. As a function of z, for different
values of β (β = 2., 3. and 10) For high pressure, or harsher environments, (β = 10) changes that would
permit upstarts to be different from other agents are not tolerated for large z. This is analogous to
counter dominance behavior theory [12]. Changes of the central agent of the star topology are unlikely
to be accepted for small z. For milder pressures changes are more easily accepted. Tolerance is
measured by the Monte Carlo acceptance probability
Again we stress the hypothesis that the likelihood of an agent in tolerating inequalities is associated to
the perceived inequalities of its social web representation. The three regimes will have strong influence
8in the possibilities of social organization of the group. In the region where H is close to zero, the
interpretation is that no inequalities can be tolerated. These would represent large fluctuations on the
cognitive-social cost and the combination of cognitive resources and band size given by z is large enough
to permit a representation web given by a full graph.
The intermediate wedge region could be interpreted as the “Big Man” society, where some inequality
is possible, but is not solidified and these temporarily more central figures can be though of as “first
among equals” and their position is liable to changes. Since the wedge decreases for increasing pressure,
for extreme ecological pressure, a Big Man organization is not possible. Either there is a stable central
figure, e.g. a chief, or symmetry among members of the band.
The lower left hand part of figure 3 (left) is where the symmetry breakdown of the web representation
permits the emergence of tolerance towards inequalities. The exchange of information about the social
webs leads to the choice of an almost unique and stable central agent for all agents. This would allow the
creation of a society where authority is stable and social egalitarianism is lost. In figure 5 we show the
probability of a change in the cognitive representation webs as a function of z, measured by the Monte
Carlo (Metropolis) acceptance rate. Only in the intermediate Big Man fluid region a significant rate of
changes is acceptable. In both hierarchical and egalitarian phases, the dynamics turns out to be very
conservative and change is rare, maintaining status quo for very long times. This prediction of the theory
is in accordance to what is expected from anthropology’s Reverse Dominance theory [12].
C. Knauft’s U-shape
FIG. 6. Schematic (inverted-) U-shape trajectory for the specific cognitive capacity z ∝ 2α/n(n− 1) as
a function of time (thick curve). The higher the value of z, the more symmetrical or egalitarian the
society will be. This is just a representation of externally caused changes in the cognitive capacity α(t)
and the mean size of social groups n(t) as a function of time. The thin lines are the shadows projected
onto the respective planes. The surface is z(α, n) ∝ 2αn(n−1) . The contours are drawn for constant z
values.
9The fact that the phase diagram can be drawn using the combination z = 2α/n(n − 1) immediately
suggests a scenario that accommodates the U-shape dynamics along the egalitarian-hierarchical spectrum.
The schematic drawing in figure 6 shows the curve z = z(α(t), n(t)) in a parametric representation using
some rough measure of time as the parameter. We use a simple model of the growth of the cognitive
capacity α in an evolutionary time scale and the fast increase in band sizes n in the transition to the
neolithic. For viewing purposes only we use different time scales along the trajectory so that the shape
is clearly a nice inverted U, otherwise it would be very skewed, since it takes around 7 million years to
go up from hierarchical to egalitarian and few thousands years to go down back to hierarchical. It starts
with low z around 7 Mya, in the hierarchical region of left hand side of the phase diagram of figure 3.
It slowly grows, reaching a peak of z in an egalitarian region due to increased encephalization. Finally
it goes back to the region of low z due to increase in band size, in the hierarchical phase of figure 3. Of
course the specific details of such trajectory would depend on many other conditions, but this furnishes
a plausible qualitative scenario for the evolution of z.
V. ETHNOGRAPHIC DATA AND THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS
FIG. 7.
Can a signature of this competition between cognitive and social navigation constraints be seen today
for modern humans? A clear theoretical prediction about the dependence of social stratification on eco-
logical pressure β and group size (z = z(n), α fixed) can be confronted to data from the ethnographic
record. The prediction is divided into two parts. First, for very mild climates intermediate social struc-
tures are expected, but, as climates of increasing harshness are considered, different social organizations
will occur. Second, this difference depends on group size. Cultures organized in small groups will be
more egalitarian, those in large groups more hierarchical.
Using Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas ([9]) we see in figure 8 that this prediction is indeed borne out by
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FIG. 8. The bifurcation signature of the phase transition. For mild climates the expected hierarchies
change little with group size. For harsh climates the expected hierarchy is larger for large groups and
smaller for smaller groups. Top Left Ethnographic Atlas data. Top Right: theory. Bottom: The
difference in expected hierarchy ∆H between large and small groups decreases for milder climates.
Continuous line: EA data, Dashed line: theory. Harsh climates are Tundra (northern areas), Northern
coniferous forest, High plateau steppe, Desert (including arctic). Mild: Temperate forest,Temperate
grasslands, Mediterranean, Oases and certain restricted river valleys.
the data. These are not predictions about a specific group becoming more or less hierarchical as climate
changes. These are predictions about the expectations we should have about hierarchical organization as
different climates and group sizes are considered. Changes in a particular group would not be so easily
observed, since the shift of perception of social webs will have an influence on motivations. See [13] for a
description of a system in the process of transition. How changing motivations lead to cultural changes
and influence social organizations is outside the scope of the present theory.
From the Ethnographic Atlas we extracted the relevant variables: data for social stratification h,
climate c and group size s. Each variable range is divided into three regimes, low, intermediate and high
(0, 1, 2 respectively, see [14]). The number of cultures in [9] with information on those three variables
is 248. From the data we obtained the conditional probability P (h|cs) = P (hcs)/P (cs). The empirical
expected hierarchy value Hemp =
∑
h hP (h|cs) for each possible combination of climate and size, is
shown in the left panel of Figure 8. The climate variables describe the type of environment but we need a
quantitative description of the climate instead of just its name. We decided that a reasonable conversion
could be done by using the idea of Net Primary Production [15] which is a measure of the amount of
calories per day that can be extracted from the environment and therefore correlates negatively to the
ecological pressure β.
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To obtain the analogous theoretical predictions, the same is done by dividing the range of theoretical
parameters into three intervals as well and calculating the same quantity from the theoretical results, see
figure 3 (right). The theoretical expected value of Hthy = 2 − 2IE(davg)/IE(dmax) is shown in the right
panel of Figure 8 .
The qualitative agreement between theory and empirical record supports that our methodology is
capable of suggesting new ways of looking at the available ethnographic records, which can now come
under scrutiny by the community of quantitative ethnography dealing with cross-cultural studies.
The fact that inequality rises with group size and that there are ecological factors involved, has been
previously considered [5, 16–20], but not how the rise is modulated by ecological pressure nor the hypoth-
esis that this is due to the competition of cognitive and social navigation needs and therefore the influence
of climatic pressure on hierarchy can be reversed by demographics. This papers are of a theoretical nature
in the spirit of the social sciences. Mathematical attempts at modeling are typically absent and at most
show the results of regressions between pairs of variables extracted from the ethnographic data.
VI. DISCUSSION
Our Statistical Mechanics approach, based on entropic inference through maximum entropy meth-
ods, is a methodological approach to the mathematical-physics modeling of systems that incorporates
conditioning factors, in this case demographic, ecological, social and cognitive.
Our main hypothesis is that a social-cognitive cost is relevant to characterize probabilistically the
perceived social webs. The introduction of the conjugated parameter β, with the same informational
content of the average cost is an unavoidable theoretical consequence. It controls the size of fluctuations
above the minimum possible value of the cost, prompting its interpretation as a pressure. Gossip, a
metaphor for information exchange, correlates the perceived webs. The cognitive capacity and the size of
the group combine into a variable z, the specific cognitive capacity, and the perceived social state can be
described in a space of just two dimensions (z, β). External to the model, the dynamics of encephalization
and band size, determine the historical evolution of z leading to a scenario for non-monotonic hierarchical
change [1]. Further changes in z could occur, e.g. due to technological advances which translate into
more effective information processing and better social navigation. Also an effective reduction of ecological
pressure, following enhanced productivity can occur. Then a more egalitarian perception of the social
web will follow. The PMB hypothesis predicts that motivations and behaviors will change, but the theory
does not go into the area of predicting how behaviors change, nor what institutions will emerge in order
to permit such behaviors, nor the time scales of these changes. Our approach to the transition from
hierarchical to egalitarian and back dispenses the issue of whether the hierarchical type of behavior lay
dormant (Rodseth in [1]) and remained present throughout the Pleistocene or whether the resurgence was
due to convergent evolution (e.g. [21]). It can be turned on or off by the joint effects of cognitive resources,
social demands, ecology and demography. These transitions resemble the freezing or evaporation of water
by changing pressure or temperature. The possibility of being solid ice is not dormant in water when it
is heated up. At least that is not a useful metaphor.
We can speculate that the time spent in the large z egalitarian phase promoted conditions for the
fixation of altruistic genes and the emergence of the ”do unto others” ideas since all are equal under the
representation web. It is hard to imagine the fixation of altruistic behavior which arises from punishment
and collaboration [22–24] in other than the symmetric phase, but this should be amenable to model
construction and analytic studies.
This simple model and the particular function we have used to represent the cognitive-social cost are
far from complete. We don’t claim specific numerical validation by confrontation with empirical data,
in any other way than just a qualitative one. More sophisticated forms of coalitions, other than dyadic
pairing, should lead to increased richness of the phase diagram, without disrupting the rough overall
picture. We have also avoided considering gender issues. Rampant sexual inequalities can exist in an
egalitarian organization of males. Nevertheless, if competition between cognitive constraints and social
navigation needs indeed occur, then phase transitions from egalitarian to hierarchical perception follows
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from general arguments. It has been argued [25] that “in the history of the human species, there is no
more significant transition than the emergence and institutionalization of inequality.” We expect that
these methods, which unify the theoretical analysis of the empirical facts behind the scenario for the U-
shape dynamics and the conditions that influence the transformation of perception of social organization,
will stimulate the use of information theory methods in the analysis of empirical research in cross-cultural
studies.
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I. APPENDIX
A. Theory: Conditional Probabilities and order parameters
The phase diagram in the β − z is shown right figure in panel 3. We divided the ranges of β and
z into three regions each: harsh, intermediate and mild climates and small medium and large groups
respectively. The phase diagram is thus divided into 9 regions. The regions are chosen essentially so that
all points in the β − z space in the harsh-large region are of the same color (blue). The same is done for
the region of harsh-small (all red) and for mild-small and mild-large. The white lines show a reasonable
choice of what is meant by large, intermediate and small both for β and n. A reasonable choice for the
values separating the three regions are β−1HI = 0.15 and β
−1
IM = 0.35. For β
−1 > β−1IM , climate c is mild.
For β−1HI < β
−1 < β−1IM , climate c is intermediate, and β
−1 < β−1HI , c is harsh.
For z = 2αn(n−1) the borders are set at z2 = 0.6 and z1 = 1.4 For 2 > z > z1, s = 1 small. For
z2 > z > z1, s = 2 intermediate. For 0 < z < z2, s = 3 large. Then we consider the order parameter
D(s, c)
D¯(s, c) =
∫
β∈c
∫
z∈sDdzdβ∫
β∈c
∫
z∈s dzdβ
, (1)
where D =
IE(davg)
IE(dmax)
. and the theoretical hierarchical order parameter that can be compared to the data
is Hthy = 2− 2D¯(s, c).
B. Data: Source
Data was obtained from [9], the Ethnographic Atlas (EA) “a database on 1167 societies coded by
George P. Murdock and published in 29 successive installments in the journal ETHNOLOGY, 1962-
1980”, available for download from the site of Douglas R. White
http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/ drwhite/worldcul/world.htm
We used the file EthnographicAtlasWCRevisedByWorldCultures.sav
The relevant variables for our study are s , h and c, which stand for size category, hierarchy category
and climate category. All variables can take integer values 1, 2 or 3. They are obtained by grouping the
EA variables into three groups:
↓Category, Value → 1 2 3
s: group size (v31) small medium large
h: social stratification (v66) Egalitarian Simple structure Complex
c: Climate (v95) Harsh Intermediate Mild
TABLE I. EA variables and categories
C. Data: Conditional Probabilities and order parameters
This values are obtained by grouping the relevant variables of the EA according to tables 1-3SM below,
into three categories. The results are presented in table 4SM below. We extract the numbers of cultures
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Number of cultures in Number of cultures in Number of cultures in
↓Stratification Climate Small groups Medium groups Large groups
1 1 12 1 0
1 2 43 40 2
1 3 4 3 0
2 1 7 5 0
2 2 11 25 3
2 3 4 3 6
3 1 0 1 3
3 2 8 23 31
3 3 2 6 5
TABLE II. Number of Cultures in the different categories in the EA.
N(s, h, c) with a given set of values (s, h, c) and the marginal numbers N(s, c) of cultures with a given pair
of values of (s, c) independently of h. These are related by N(s, c) =
∑
h=1,2,3N(s, h, c). The conditional
probabilities are
P (h|sc) = N(s, h, c)
N(s, c)
, (2)
of a culture having a given class stratification , given its climate and group size.
Then we calculate the average hierarchy of the cultures with the same values of n and c, that is, that
belong to the same size and climate categories. We calculate the empirical average hierarchies conditional
on size and climate
H¯ = IE(h− 1|sc) =
∑
h=1,2,3
(h− 1)P (h|sc), (3)
which satisfies 0 ≤ H¯ ≤ 2.
Fluctuations around the average
σ2EA = IE((h− h¯)2|nc) =
∑
h=1,2,3
(h− h¯)2P (h|nc), (4)
can be calculated to define error bars.
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D. Numerical results
↓Climate, Group size → Small Medium Large groups
Harsh .37 1. 2.
Intermediate .44 .81 1.81
Mild .80 1.25 1.45
TABLE III. The results for the empirical stratification H¯
↓Climate, Group size → Small Medium Large groups
Harsh .01 .64 1.58
Intermediate .13 .56 1.25
Mild .39 .58 .77
TABLE IV. The results for the theoretical prediction HT
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E. Ethnographic data
N Code Description v31. Size category
681 0 Missing data (code .) 0
118 1 Fewer than 50 1
107 2 50-99 1
104 3 100-199 2
83 4 200-399 2
60 5 400-1000 2
16 6 1,000 without any town of more than 5,000 3
36 7 Towns of 5,000-50,000 (one or more) 3
62 8 Cities of more than 50,000 (one or more) 3
TABLE V. Variable v31 of the Ethnographic Atlas: Mean Size of Local Communities.
N Code Description v66. Hierarchy category
182 0 Missing data (code .) 0
533 1 Absence among freemen (O.) 1
206 2 Wealth distinctions (W.) 2
39 3 Elite (based on control of land or other resources (E.) 2
228 4 Dual (hereditary aristocracy) (D.) 3
79 5 Complex (social classes) (C.) 3
TABLE VI. Variable v66 of the Ethnographic Atlas: Class Stratification.
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N Code Description v95. Climate category
869 0 Not coded 0
3 51 Desert (including arctic) 1
11 23 Tundra (northern areas) 1
21 36 Northern coniferous forest 1
8 44 High plateau steppe 1
5 65 Oases and certain restricted river valleys 1
37 52 Desert grasses and shrubs 2
16 56 Temperate woodland 2
24 74 Sub-tropical bush 2
27 78 Sub-tropical rain forest 2
64 84 Tropical grassland 2
14 87 Monsoon forest 2
113 88 Tropical rain forest 2
25 54 Temperate grasslands 3
19 46 Temperate forest (mostly mountainous) 3
11 55 Mediterranean (dry, deciduous, and evergreen forests) 3
TABLE VII. v95 Climate: Primary Environment. Group 1 is formed by NPP up to 350gC/m2/year
Group 2: between 350gC/m2/year and 600gC/m2/year. Group 3: large than 600gC/m2/year.
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F. Cultures: Size, Class Stratification , Climate
Table 8 List of all cultures with available information in all three categories
Culture Size(v31) Stratification(v66) Climate(v95)
1 !KUNG 1 1 2
2 ILA 2 2 2
3 NYORO 2 3 2
4 AMBA 2 1 2
5 KPE 1 2 2
6 FON 3 3 2
7 KISSI 2 1 2
8 BAMBARA 3 3 2
9 YATENGA 3 3 2
10 KATAB 2 1 2
11 KONSO 3 2 3
12 SOMALI 1 2 2
13 WOLOF 3 3 2
14 TEDA 1 3 3
15 BARABRA 1 2 1
16 GHEG 2 1 1
17 NEWENGLAN 3 3 2
18 DUTCH 3 3 2
19 SERBS 3 3 2
20 SYRIANS 3 2 3
21 SINDHI 3 2 2
22 KAZAK 1 3 3
23 GILYAK 1 1 1
24 YAKUT 1 2 1
25 KOREANS 3 3 2
26 LOLO 2 3 3
27 ABOR 2 2 2
28 CHENCHU 1 1 2
29 TAMIL 3 3 2
30 ANDAMANES 1 1 2
31 MERINA 3 3 2
32 GARO 2 2 2
33 LAMET 1 2 2
34 MNONGGAR 2 2 2
35 ATAYAL 2 1 2
36 SAGADA 3 2 2
37 JAVANESE 3 3 2
38 MACASSARE 2 3 2
39 ARANDA 1 1 2
40 KAPAUKU 1 2 2
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Culture Size(v31) Stratification(v66) Climate(v95)
41 WANTOAT 1 1 2
42 TRUKESE 2 1 2
43 TROBRIAND 2 3 2
44 SAMOANS 1 3 2
45 TIKOPIA 2 3 2
46 NABESNA 1 1 1
47 TAREUMIUT 2 2 1
48 TWANA 1 2 1
49 NOMLAKI 2 2 3
50 TENINO 2 2 1
51 OJIBWA 1 1 1
52 HURON 2 2 1
53 HANO 2 1 2
54 CUNA 1 2 2
55 WARRAU 1 1 2
56 MUNDURUCU 1 1 2
57 SIRIONO 1 1 2
58 TUCUNA 2 1 2
59 INCA 3 3 1
60 YAHGAN 1 1 1
61 MATACO 1 1 2
62 TRUMAI 1 1 2
63 DOROBO 1 1 2
64 NAMA 2 2 2
65 LOZI 1 3 2
66 BEMBA 2 3 2
67 KUBA 2 3 2
68 CHAGGA 2 3 2
69 KIKUYU 2 2 2
70 FANG 1 2 2
71 ASHANTI 3 3 2
72 DOGON 2 2 2
73 TALLENSI 2 2 2
74 TIV 2 1 2
75 AZANDE 2 3 2
76 MASAI 1 1 2
77 TIGRINYA 3 3 2
78 SONGHAI 3 3 2
79 SIWANS 3 2 3
80 EGYPTIANS 3 3 3
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Culture Size(v31) Stratification(v66) Climate(v95)
81 RIFFIANS 3 2 3
82 ROMANS 3 3 3
83 IRISH 3 3 2
84 LAPPS 1 2 1
85 HUTSUL 3 2 3
86 PATHAN 2 3 2
87 KHALKA 1 3 2
88 CHUKCHEE 1 2 1
89 YURAK 1 2 1
90 MIAO 2 1 2
91 BURUSHO 2 3 1
92 LEPCHA 2 2 3
93 BENGALI 3 3 2
94 MARIAGOND 1 2 2
95 TODA 1 1 2
96 TANALA 2 3 2
97 VEDDA 1 1 2
98 BURMESE 3 3 2
99 SEMANG 1 1 2
100 ANNAMESE 3 3 2
101 IFUGAO 2 2 2
102 SUBANUN 1 1 2
103 BALINESE 2 3 2
104 ALORESE 2 2 2
105 MURNGIN 1 1 2
106 TIWI 2 1 2
107 WOGEO 1 1 2
108 MAJURO 2 3 2
109 IFALUK 1 1 2
110 KURTATCHI 2 3 2
111 LESU 2 1 2
112 BUNLAP 1 2 2
113 LAU 1 2 2
114 PUKAPUKAN 2 1 2
115 MAORI 2 3 3
116 MARQUESAN 1 3 2
117 COPPERESK 1 1 1
118 KASKA 1 1 1
119 YUROK 1 2 3
120 TUBATULAB 1 1 2
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Culture Size(v31) Stratification(v66) Climate(v95)
121 HAVASUPAI 2 1 2
122 SANPOIL 1 1 3
123 OMAHA 1 1 3
124 CREEK 2 1 3
125 NAVAHO 2 1 2
126 ZUNI 3 1 2
127 AZTEC 3 3 3
128 BARAMACAR 1 1 2
129 TAPIRAPE 2 1 2
130 JIVARO 1 1 1
131 YAGUA 1 1 2
132 AYMARA 2 2 1
133 CAYAPA 2 1 2
134 MAPUCHE 1 2 3
135 BACAIRI 1 1 2
136 NAMBICUAR 1 1 2
137 AWEIKOMA 1 1 2
138 RAMCOCAME 2 1 2
139 MBUTI 2 1 2
140 MBUNDU 2 3 2
141 VENDA 2 3 3
142 NYAKYUSA 2 1 2
143 MENDE 2 3 2
144 YORUBA 3 3 2
145 BIRIFOR 2 1 2
146 MAMBILA 2 1 3
147 MARGI 2 1 2
148 MAMVU 1 1 2
149 SHILLUK 2 3 2
150 LANGO 2 2 2
151 IRAQW 2 2 2
152 MZAB 3 3 3
153 KABYLE 2 1 2
154 TRISTAN 2 1 3
155 WALLOONS 3 3 2
156 CZECHS 3 3 2
157 HEBREWS 3 3 3
158 HAZARA 2 2 2
159 KORYAK 2 2 1
160 YUKAGHIR 1 1 1
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Culture Size(v31) Stratification(v66) Climate(v95)
161 JAPANESE 3 3 2
162 MINCHINES 3 3 2
163 TIBETANS 3 3 1
164 COORG 2 3 2
165 KERALA 3 3 2
166 NICOBARES 1 1 2
167 SINHALESE 3 3 2
168 KACHIN 2 3 3
169 PURUM 1 2 2
170 CAMBODIAN 3 3 2
171 HANUNOO 2 1 2
172 DUSUN 2 2 2
173 DIERI 1 1 2
174 KARIERA 1 1 2
175 KERAKI 1 1 2
176 PONAPEANS 1 3 2
177 YAPESE 1 3 2
178 ULAWANS 2 1 2
179 NASKAPI 1 1 1
180 EYAK 1 2 1
181 ATSUGEWI 1 2 3
182 MIAMI 2 1 2
183 CHEROKEE 2 1 2
184 DELAWARE 2 1 2
185 MARICOPA 1 1 2
186 TAOS 2 1 2
187 HUICHOL 2 2 2
188 CHOCO 1 1 2
189 CARINYA 2 1 2
190 GUAHIBO 1 1 2
191 CUBEO 1 1 2
192 TUNEBO 2 1 2
193 ONA 1 1 1
194 CHOROTI 1 1 2
195 CAMAYURA 2 1 2
196 BOTOCUDO 1 1 2
197 SOTHO 2 3 3
198 YAO 2 1 2
199 YOMBE 2 3 2
200 GANDA 3 3 2
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Culture Size(v31) Stratification(v66) Climate(v95)
201 BETE 2 1 2
202 NUPE 2 3 2
203 CONIAGUI 1 1 2
204 BAYA 2 1 2
205 LUO 2 2 2
206 CHEREMIS 2 2 2
207 NURI 2 2 2
208 AINU 1 1 2
209 OKINAWANS 3 3 2
210 DARD 2 3 2
211 BHIL 1 3 2
212 AKHA 2 1 2
213 PAIWAN 2 3 2
214 WIKMUNKAN 1 1 2
215 ENGA 2 1 2
216 LAKALAI 2 2 2
217 ATTAWAPIS 1 1 1
218 DIEGUENO 2 1 2
219 WASHO 1 1 3
220 PAWNEE 2 3 3
221 COCHITI 2 1 2
222 YUCATECMA 3 3 2
223 WAICA 1 1 2
224 TEHUELCHE 1 1 2
225 NGONI 2 3 2
226 WUTE 2 3 2
227 BRAZILIAN 3 3 2
228 BULGARIAN 3 3 2
229 BASSERI 2 2 2
230 KET 1 1 1
231 MINCHIA 2 2 3
232 KHASI 1 3 2
233 SIAMESE 3 2 2
234 PURARI 2 2 2
235 ONOTOA 2 2 2
236 MANUS 2 2 2
237 YUKI 1 2 3
238 NATCHEZ 2 2 2
239 JEMEZ 2 1 2
240 BLACKCARI 3 1 2
241 MAM 3 2 3
242 MISKITO 2 1 2
243 GOAJIRO 1 2 2
244 YABARANA 1 1 2
245 CHIBCHA 3 3 1
246 ALACALUF 1 1 3
247 APINAYE 1 1 2
248 TUPINAMBA 2 2 2
